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Abstract  
Projections of future traffic in the national 
airspace show that most of the hub airports and their 
attendant airspace will need to undergo significant 
redevelopment and redesign in order to accommodate 
any significant increase in traffic volume. Even 
though closely spaced parallel approaches increase 
throughput into a given airport, controller workload 
in oversubscribed metroplexes is further taxed by 
these approaches that require stringent monitoring in 
a saturated environment. The interval management 
(IM) concept in the TRACON area is designed to 
shift some of the operational burden from the control 
tower to the flight deck, placing the flight crew in 
charge of implementing the required speed changes 
to maintain a relative spacing interval. The interval 
management tolerance is a measure of the allowable 
deviation from the desired spacing interval for the IM 
aircraft (and its target aircraft). For this complex task, 
Formal Methods can help to ensure better design and 
system implementation.  
In this paper, we propose a probabilistic 
framework to quantify the uncertainty and 
performance associated with the major components 
of the IM tolerance. The analytical basis for this 
framework may be used to formalize both correctness 
and probabilistic system safety claims in a modular 
fashion at the algorithmic level in a way compatible 
with several Formal Methods tools. 
Introduction 
The transportation of people and goods through 
the air is a critical part of our country's infrastructure 
and economy. The Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen) seeks to transform 
the current centrally-controlled, voice-
communication-based air transportation system into 
an information-rich, highly automated, and agile 
system that is safer, more environmentally 
acceptable, and sufficiently scalable and adaptable to 
allow for large increases in air traffic and system 
disruptions.  
NextGen will require an evolutionary plan to 
provide automation tools to support controllers and 
pilots in flexible, collaborative decision making as 
well as to assure necessary emergent properties (such 
as system safety) over a heterogeneous mix of 
equipage, algorithms and operational procedures (see 
Figure 1). System wide fault tolerance is necessary. 
This is a distinct property from the fault-tolerance of 
individual components of the system. Taken in the 
context of software agents interacting, even if an 
algorithm is provably correct, a component may fail, 
and an algorithm's implementation may fail due to 
faults arising from such problems as unexpected 
latency in communication, cumulative sensor errors, 
garbled messages, computational errors between 
algorithm variants, or even malicious attacks. These 
faults can then propagate in unexpected ways to other 
components of the overall system, and means must be 
in place to mitigate such occurrences.  
One new concept for NextGen is interval 
management (IM), which relies on the notion of 
trajectory based operations in concert with improved 
capabilities in computer technology and a move from 
ground-based navigation aids to satellite-based 
navigation systems to increase capacity. At the heart 
of the concept is a shift in flight planning and 
separation responsibility away from ground-based 
ATC to the flight deck, where pilots will be able to 
make decisions on the routes, altitudes, and speeds of 
their aircraft, both tactically and strategically based 
on their intent. Decentralized decisions, however, can 
impact global optimality and performance.  
We present a modular framework for assessing 
the safety of IM algorithms by developing formal 
specifications of the components, their interactions 
and the necessary set of safety properties.  This 
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framework allows a close and direct linkage between 
probabilistic analysis and the algorithm 
implementation. 
Probabilistic analysis is typically performed 
using a model of the system.  We are seeking here to 
instead link the probabilistic analysis more directly to 
the system at the code level. We hope this rigorous 
and systematic examination of the system will 
eliminate overlooked special cases of the system's 
algorithms and allow for a more complete study of 
the implementation's behavior. 
This paper is divided as follows. The first 
section presents the interval management application, 
where we describe the relation between the IM 
concept and an algorithm that could be used to 
implement it. The second section describes the 
components of the speed control algorithm. The third 
section shows the correctness of the speed control 
algorithm. The fourth section illustrates how it is 
possible to do probabilistic analysis at the algorithm 
level. Finally the last section gives the conclusions 
and directions for future research.  
Interval Management 
The airspace involves interactions of numerous 
entities: aircraft with continuous dynamics, control 
algorithms (both onboard and in control towers) with 
discrete logic, human decision makers (both onboard 
aircraft and in control towers), sensors and actuators, 
and communications channels, as well as the flight 
rules that govern operational procedures.  
Algorithms are an important part of the NextGen 
concept.  Different aspects of NextGen may involve 
numerous different proposed algorithms.  For 
example, an overview of aircraft separation 
algorithms can be found in [1]. This paper focuses on 
an algorithm performing the interval management 
operation, incorporating probability analysis to 
improve its design.  
The main actors of the IM operation are the IM 
aircraft, with a position and air speed denoted by 
xIM(t), vIM(t) and the target aircraft, with position and 
air speed denoted by xT(t), vT(t).  
Interval management operations can be divided 
in three phases: negotiation, where aircraft on two 
different trajectories determine how they will both 
follow a common trajectory (the order of merging), 
action, where they merge onto a common trajectory, 
and the terminal approach phase, where one aircraft 
follows the descent path of the other [2]. This work 
focuses on the third phase, terminal approach. In this 
phase aircraft have already merged and are flying on 
a single leg in a straight path to the terminal. The 
dynamic of the IM and target aircraft are described 
by the following differential equations: 
  
  
           
              
  
  
 
       
 
       
 
Where γ is the flight path, v true air speed, Ψ heading 
angle, α angle of attack, T thrust, D drag, g gravity 
and m mass.  
The actual position of the aircraft performing the 
interval management (the “own ship”) along its 
trajectory path is denoted by xIM(t), and the actual 
position of the target aircraft along its trajectory path 
is denoted by xT(t). The measured positions and 
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velocities of the aircraft are sampled with some fixed 
frequency (in the case of ADS-B messages, every 1 
second). The positions and velocities are based on 
GPS data and are sent via ADS-B communication 
channels, all subject to errors. 
There are several potential means of determining 
the proper spacing of aircraft on approach.  While in 
all cases the ultimate goal is to maintain a certain 
physical separation distance D, in practice this may 
also be maintained through temporal spacing, which 
simulations have suggested produces better 
performance [3,4,5].  If the target aircraft passes 
through a certain point at time t, then the IM aircraft 
is required to pass through the same point at a later 
time t+τ, with a small amount of leeway. 
While under interval management, if two aircraft 
are separated by less than the specified minimum 
distance D at a given instant in time, then the amount 
of overlap is called the spacing error. When keeping 
aircraft separated temporally, the range error is used 
instead.  The range error is the distance between the 
along-path position of the IM aircraft at time t and 
the along-path position of the target aircraft at time t-
τ, where τ is the desired time spacing interval 
between the aircraft. The range error is calculated by 
e(t)=xIM(t)-xT(t-τ) [6].  
The speed command applied to the IM aircraft is 
a function of the range error and the speed of the 
target aircraft v
c 
=F(e(t),VT(t)). There are several 
ways to calculate the speed command [5-8].  
We model the IM aircraft in such a way that we 
assume that the thrust and drag are the primary means 
of changing the IM aircraft dynamics.  Therefore 
altering the values of these variables represents the 
application of the speed command [9]. 
The IM speed control algorithm relies upon 
ADS-B position and velocity measurements 
broadcast by the target aircraft, where the position 
and velocity accuracy depends on the accuracy of the 
GPS readings. Let εs be a predicate that is true if the 
measured position and velocity values are within 
expected tolerances. 
Speed Control Algorithm 
The desired speed command, v
c
, is a speed that 
will preserve the IM spacing that is defined by the 
range error being less than some distance D, as 
follows |e(t)|=|xIM(t)-xTar(t-τ)|<D, and conflict means 
that there exists a t such that |e(t)| D. 
The implementation of the speed command to 
the IM aircraft would be an algorithm with the 
following imperative instructions and special actions:  
 read: read the position and speed of 
IM and target aircraft and store them 
 cd is the conflict detection algorithm, 
where given the position and speed it 
calculates if there is a conflict in the 
time window between two subsequent 
messages.  If a conflict is detected, 
then it returns a true value, denoted by 
cd=T, and cd=F otherwise. 
 comp_maneuver: compute the 
desired speed, the thrust, and drag and 
store them 
  act: null action.  The algorithm does 
not change the aircraft dynamic. 
 act: The algorithm alters the aircraft 
thrust and drag in order to get the 
desired speed command 
 comp_time: estimate the time to 
transition the desired speed command 
and the time it takes to perform these 
calculations and store this value 
 alarm: issue an alarm.  The algorithm 
cannot solve the conflict 
 cdw: returns cdw=T if the conflict 
detection algorithm determines there 
will be a conflict in the time window 
stored by the comp_time command.  
If there is no projected conflict, cdw=F 
The speed control algorithm (with desired pre- 
and post conditions) is as follows: 
read 
IF cd=F THEN  
  act  
ELSE  
 comp_maneuver 
 comp_time 
 IF cdw=F THEN  
  act  
   ELSE  
  alarm  
 ENDIF 
ENDIF 
  If no conflict is detected, then no corrective 
action is taken.  If a conflict is detected, however, 
then a corrective maneuver will be calculated.  If the 
maneuver is projected to be able to resolve the 
conflict, then it will be enacted, otherwise an alarm 
will be raised. 
Our analysis is primarily concerned with 
missing an actual conflict. The noted precondition is 
that the sensor values must be within acceptable 
tolerances and there is an actual conflict.  That means 
there is the possibility that the conflict is not detected 
(possibly due to measurement errors), as well as the 
possibility of failure in other steps of the algorithm.  
The end result of executing the algorithm should be 
that, if a conflict exists, it is either resolved or else an 
alert is issued.  
Speed Control Algorithm Correctness 
The correctness of an algorithm is related to the 
goals of the process to be carried out. Informally, the 
set of beliefs concerning the purpose of the algorithm 
is referred to as its specification. We can then say that 
the algorithm is correct with respect to its 
specifications if, for the valid range of input data 
accepted by the algorithm, the result produced by the 
algorithm is both predicted and repeatable. An 
algorithm that always produces the expected 
answer(s) if it terminates is said to be partially 
correct. An algorithm that is always guaranteed to 
terminate, given the resource bounds detailed in the 
specifications, is regarded as being feasible and 
correct. Note that if the resource bounds are not met, 
the algorithm may not terminate.  
Program verification based on deductive 
methods uses either automatic decision procedures or 
proof assistants to ensure the validity of user-
annotated code. These annotations often express 
domain-specific properties of the code. However, 
formulating annotations correctly (i.e., as precisely as 
the domain expert really intends) is nontrivial in 
practice. The challenges of producing domain 
specific code annotation arise along two directions. 
First, the domain knowledge has its own inherent 
complexity. In this interval management application, 
for example, the annotations are required to capture 
the expression of system-wide safety properties. 
Second, the code annotations are required to be stated 
in a manner that can be interpreted by some theorem 
proving software. The logical language supported by 
a particular verification tool may be too weak to 
express the desired user defined and domain specific 
code annotations.  Many automatic decision 
procedures, for example, are limited to bounded 
integer arithmetic o, at most, rational linear algebra. 
In order to solve these two challenges this paper 
proposes to use Hoare logic [10]. Hoare logic is a 
formal system with a set of logical rules for reasoning 
about the correctness of a program. The central 
feature of Hoare logic is the Hoare triple. A Hoare 
triple describes how the execution of a piece of 
program changes the state of the computation. The 
triple has the form {P}S{Q} where P and Q are 
assertions indicating pre-conditions and post-
conditions and S is a command. The basic idea is 
that, given some P, after executing S, Q will hold. It 
is possible to annotate the algorithm as follows  (with 
  being the logical and symbol and   being the 
symbol for logical or, and the predicate do(X) 
indicate the command X is to be performed): 
{εs ∧ conflict} 
IF cd=F THEN  act ELSE s’ ENDIF 
{¬conflict   do(alarm)} 
Where s’ = 
 comp_maneuver 
 comp_time 
 IF cdw=F THEN  
  act  
 ELSE  
  alarm  
 ENDIF 
This annotation indicates the desired result: 
given the state information is within acceptable 
bounds and there is a conflict, once the speed control 
algorithm is executed then either the conflict will be 
resolved or an alarm will be issued. 
Using the Hoare logic the speed control 
algorithm is equivalent to: 
{εs ∧ conflict ∧ cd=F} act {¬conflict}  
or 
{εs ∧ conflict ∧ cd=T}s’{¬conflict   do(alarm)} 
We propose that, using Hoare logic with annotations, 
it is possible to prove the correctness of this sort of 
interval management algorithm.  One way to prove 
the correctness would be to use certain program 
analysis tools such as Frama-C[11,12].
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The algorithm correctness is with respect to its 
annotations, but there are still uncertainties inherent 
in the information provided by the annotations. The 
next section focuses in the analysis of these 
uncertainties. 
Speed Control Algorithm Uncertainty 
The IM tolerance |e(t)|<D is a measure of the 
allowable deviation from the desired spacing interval 
for the IM aircraft (and its target aircraft) during the 
execution of the algorithm. The IM tolerance 
represents the bounds on the fault free spacing 
precision that must be achieved and maintained by an 
IM aircraft implementing the flight deck based speed 
control algorithm; it is usually quantified in a 
probabilistic fashion as Pr[conflict] ≤p [13,14]. 
The IM tolerance is directly affected by the 
quality of the state data, attained through GPS and 
other sensors and ADS-B with probability Pr[εs]. 
Here we will look at two cases: missed alerts and 
false alerts. 
Missed Alerts 
The main idea is to analyze how the state data 
uncertainty in the measurements can affect the IM 
tolerance. The goal is to never reach {conflict} after 
applying the speed control algorithm no matter 
whether the condition cd is true or false. In the event 
that a conflict is unavoidable, the algorithm should 
raise an alert. 
Let recall our basic speed control algorithm: 
IF cd=F THEN  act ELSE s’ ENDIF 
Using the annotations, we wish to prove that the 
probability of the following happening is acceptably 
low: 
                                                     
1 These specific tools do not require an annotation at each line as 
proposed by Hoare. Instead they rely on the Dijkstra-style 
weakest precondition calculus to compute the backward 
semantics of the function code S to the post-condition Q and 
generate the weakest pre-condition wp(S;Q) that is guaranteed to 
obtain Q after executing S. What actually needs to be proved is 
that this weakest pre-condition holds [15]. 
{εs ∧ conflict} 
IF cd=F THEN  act ELSE s’ ENDIF 
{conflict    do(alarm)} 
The precondition indicates that the sensor values 
are within the expected range with some probability 
and that there exists an actual conflict. The post-
condition of this undesirable situation is that after the 
algorithm executes there still a conflict and no alarm 
has been indicated. 
The IM tolerance Pr[conflict]≤p and the 
probability of the sensor error Pr[εs] could be 
obtained from aviation standards such as [16]. The 
question to be answered is what would be the 
probabilistic requirements for the cd and s' 
components of the algorithms such that the IM 
tolerance is held with the required probability.  
The speed control algorithm is required to hold 
the IM tolerence with a certain probability p: 
  [
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And this is equal to: 
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For how this if-construct affects the probability, see 
[17]. 
This inequality is called the uncertainty budget. 
The uncertainty budget analysis consists of checking 
the necessary conditions for each module of the 
control speed algorithm in order to preserve the 
uncertainty budget.  The following is one possible, 
though conservative, way of dividing the uncertainty 
budget among subcomponents. 
We know that if both of the left-hand side terms 
of the uncertainty budget are less than p/2 then the 
IM tolerance will hold. 
Let us first focus on the first element of the 
uncertainty budget, which is equal to 
  [
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]
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Because we assume a conflict actually exists, outside 
of any external forces acting on the aircraft, the first 
probability is equal to one.  Therefore, 
Pr[εs ∧ conflict ∧ cd=F}] ≤ 
 
 
 
and this is equal to 
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The first element of this inequality is the probability 
of missing the alert due to sensor error; such an 
analysis can be seen in [18,19]. We then need to 
guarantee that the product of the sensor error 
probability and missed alert probability needs to be 
less than p/2. One way to hold the inequality is if the 
two expressions are  
[c1]  Pr[
               
  
] ≤ √
 
 
 
and  
[c2]  Pr[εs] ≤ √
 
 
 
This mean that we need to guarantee that both the 
probability of missing the alert because of sensor 
error and that the probability of the sensor error needs 
to be less than √   .  
Now we perform the same analysis for the 
second term of the uncertainty budget. 
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Then the required probability for the subalgorithm s’ 
could be  
[c3]  Pr[
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And a conservative value for the second component 
is 
[c4]  Pr[
               
  
]  Pr[εs]≤ √
 
 
 
Now having these inequalities, one possible 
condition to preserve the IM tolerance is as follows: 
Lemma: if the inequalities [c1,..,c4] hold then the 
uncertainty budget holds.  
The basic idea for the proof is to use basic 
inequalities properties such as if       and 
      then      , and if   √  and   √  
then      , where a,b,c are positive real 
numbers.  
The uncertainty budget analysis allows us to see 
how, given data for the uncertainty of the sensor 
measurement and IM tolerance it is possible to put 
bounds to the probability of missing conflict alerts, as 
well as other pieces of code such as s’. 
False Alerts 
The other main case of concern is a false 
positive in the initial detection, which will either 
induce an unnecessary maneuver (which itself could 
potentially result in a new conflict) or signal a false 
alarm.  This can be captured with the pre- and post 
conditions: 
{εs ∧ conflict} 
IF cd=F THEN  act ELSE s’ ENDIF 
{do(act)   do(alarm)} 
In this situation, the speed control algorithm 
should do nothing with a certain probability p': 
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And this is equal to: 
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From the algorithm, the probability of the first term is 
equal to zero, so the probability of a false alert is 
found by calculating: 
Pr[εs ∧ conflict ∧ cd=T}]  ≤ p' 
Conclusion 
The safety argument for NextGen interval 
management concepts relies on the ability to reliably 
detect conflicts.  Because of unavoidable errors in 
sensor and transmission data, we cannot guarantee 
that the probability of a missed alert is zero.  We can, 
however, provide arguments that a given algorithm 
will only produce missed alerts with a probability 
within a certain tolerance. We have proposed a 
framework that links the probabilities associated with 
the subcomponents of an algorithm through 
annotations in the code, and have provided a simple 
interval management algorithm along with its 
annotations. The annotations used in this framework 
are compatible with several Formal Methods tools; 
these can be used to demonstrate the (partial) 
correctness of an algorithm.  In addition, the 
annotations used to perform a probabilistic analysis 
of the algorithm in the form of an uncertainty budget, 
and we sketch this process for the interval 
management algorithm. 
As future research we would like to formalize 
the annotations in an appropriate machine-readable 
format (such as in ACSL), which would allow us to 
automatically verify the logical partial correctness of 
the algorithm in a tool set such as Frama-C.  While 
such an automatic tool is unlikely to be able to 
perform the full analysis, it should be able to treat the 
probabilistic terms as uninterpreted and create proof 
obligations that could then be checked in an 
interactive theorem prover such as PVS [20].  
Additional research will also be necessary to find 
reasonable means of determining the appropriate 
probabilities and bounds for projected sensor data, 
such as is used in s'. 
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